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Abstract 
Agricultural intensification is widely seen as a condition sine-qua-non for enhanced food security and as a major 
driver for overall economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In this process, the financial system has an 
important role to play, especially to finance agricultural inputs. However in SSA, the financial institutions 
initiated by governments and donors have in general not lived up to the expectations, in particular not for the 
agricultural sector, because of inappropriate design and weaknesses in implementation. Even the microfinance 
institutions which were supposed to support the small-scale farmers have deflected for their goals due to the risks 
that the agricultural sector represents. To date, the economic research tends to concentrate on the mechanisms 
that secure the credit of microfinance institutions. However, the effective implementation of new mechanisms to 
secure credit appears more difficult than foreseen, as the decision making processes involved are complex and 
constrained by the lack of information. This paper argues that sustainable agricultural financing needs alternative 
schemes that secure both the credit of financial institutions and farmers’ income. It will also be shown how the 
new institutional economics perspective can be used to analyze and guide decision-making with respect to 
alternative schemes for agricultural financing. This paper which is based on quantitative and qualitative data 
presents the case of the inventory credit scheme on maize to facilitate access to agricultural inputs in Savannah 
region of Togo. In conclusion, some research areas will be indicated to improve our understanding of the 
inventory credit system. 
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Introduction 
In the Northern part of Togo (West Africa), the 
Savannah region, agriculture is by far the most 
important economic activity and provides food, and a 
large part of the income of its population. this region is 
also the poorest region of the country; 86% of the rural 
population are considered (Ministry of Economy, 
2004). Under these circumstances, increased 
productivity of the agricultural sector is seen as an 
essential element of any strategy to stimulate 
economic growth within the region. It is also noted 
that increased agricultural production (and 
productivity) will largely depend on the adoption of 
more intensive technologies. To sustain such a 
process, financial institutions will have an important 
role to play. Farmers, in particular, will need loans to 
buy inputs (and eventually also better equipment). 
Financing will also play a pivotal role both down or 
upwards in the value chains, for input suppliers (e.g. 
inventory), processors (e.g. small-scale processing 
equipment), transporters and traders (Konlambigue,  
2006). However, because of market failures and 
perceived riskiness of agricultural production, 
microfinance institutions (MFI), the only group of 
formal lenders is reluctant to provide the financial 
services that would enable intensification to take off. 
Small scale farmers generally sell part of their 
agricultural production right after the harvest to meet 
social obligations, to repay loans – from informal 
lenders – and satisfy other consumption needs. As 
prices are low, in particular during that period, farmers 
often have to sell more than the actual surplus that 
they produced to meet their immediate obligations. 
Later on during the season, they will buy the cereals 
back. The major point is that small scale farmers in the 
Region lack sufficient income from either agriculture 
or other non-agricultural activities to buy agricultural 
inputs, nor to invest much capital in any other way 
(e.g. construction of compost pits) in agricultural 
intensification. As a consequence, smallholder farmers 
are trapped in a vicious circles all leading to 
(increased) food insecurity and poverty. In response to 
these difficult circumstances, a large farmers’ 
organization in the Region, the CAP has been Financing Agricultural Inputs in Northern Togo  
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experimenting various mechanisms to provide 
agricultural inputs to their members, based on 
collective strategies (pooling of demand) and pro-
active networking with public and private sector input 
suppliers. Yet, the mechanisms have quickly shown 
their limits. Today the organization is looking for new 
innovative solutions, among which the inventory credit 
system. It has however some concerns about the 
feasibility.  
In this paper – which results from a case study – first, 
some concepts from the New Institutional Economics 
will be used to analyze the role and strategies of the 
actors involved in the input supply system, including 
their inter-relationships. Both farmers’ and lenders’ 
perceptions will be addressed. Secondly, the volatility 
of the maize price in the region will be studied using 
quantitative methods in order to verify that price risks 
justify the implementation of an inventory credit 
system. Finally it will be shown that innovative 
institutional arrangements that solve at least part of the 
coordination problems are required to that secure 
access to credit for agricultural inputs.  
Materials and methods 
The information presented in this paper is based on 
information retrieved from all kinds of documents 
(including statistical reports – though only very 
marginally available and of uncertain reliability, 
reports from NGOs and producer organizations), 
results observations and in-depth discussions with the 
main actors: the Centrale d’Auto-promotion Paysanne 
(CAPs), a farmer – based organization (FBO), the 
‘Caisse Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit’ (CMEC), a 
farmer – controlled savings and credit structure, input 
suppliers and facilitation institutions.  
For the quantitative analysis, a data set consisting of 
monthly maize prices from 1999 to 2004 on 
representative markets of the four prefectures in the 
region (Kpendjal, Oti, Tandjoaré and Tône) has been 
established and exploited. The price in the Prefecture 
of Tône has been used as reference. E-views 5.0 is the 
computer software used to perform the analysis.  
The New Institutional Economics and agricultural 
credit market failures  
In most of the Sub-Saharan African countries, the high 
level of transaction costs (infrastructure and 
information), thin markets and difficulties in the 
enforcement of contracts are the main reasons of the 
unwillingness of the private sector, notably banks and 
MFI, to offer credit to farmers. As a result, there is a 
market failure in the provision of credit to rural 
households and farmers are unable to finance the 
purchase of agricultural inputs such as modern seeds 
and fertilizers (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2003). In such 
risky environments, formal lenders have little 
incentive to invest in financing of smallholder 
agriculture. The riskiness of agriculture, from the 
formal lenders’ point of view, is essentially the result 
of price and/or climatic risks; risks that are relatively 
well-known and understood. Dorward and Kydd 
(2004) add two other sources of risk, the lack of 
economic coordination and opportunism. Coordination 
risks refer to those situations where the returns to an 
investment of actor A, is dependent upon 
complementary action involving other actors, whose 
behavior is uncertain. Opportunism in this context, 
refers to the situation where an actor who involved in 
any complementary action has some kind of monopoly 
power, and is able (and probably willing) to capture an 
undue share of the revenues in the supply chain. 
Particular attention is required to reduce such risks 
during the elaboration of any policy that aims to 
stimulate private sector investment, and chain 
development. The New Institutional Economics 
perspective sees institutional response and innovation 
as key to facilitate and improve coordination between 
actors. Williamson (2000) defined an institution as an 
arrangement between economic units that governs the 
ways in which its members can cooperate and/or 
compete (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2003). Many 
alternative systems of financing, through vertical and 
horizontal ‘integration’ are experimenting in rural 
areas as an institutional response to agricultural credit 
market failures.  
The forecasting of agricultural products prices 
volatility 
The inventory credit scheme has its interest in areas 
where the price variance, and thus the risk, is high. So 
it is important to model the volatility forecast using the 
volatility of a product’s price in this paper, the model 
ARCH developed by Engel (1982) and generalized in 
GARCH (Generalized ARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) 
and Taylor (1986). The GARCH (1, 1) is based on the 
assumption that forecasts of prices variance changing 
in time depend on the lagged variance of prices 
(Matringe, 2004). An unexpected increase or decrease 
in the price at time t will generate an increase or 
decrease in the expected variability in the next period. 
The model is defined in this study as such: Konlambigue, A. 
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2 represent respectively news about 
the volatility  and the forecast variance  from the 
previous period.  
To capture the best periods for the storage and the 
selling of maize, a series of dummy variables have 
been introduced in the model through following steps.  
Step 1: Model 1 
First, dummy variables related to the months of the 
years have been integrated in the regression in order to 
identify the months of highest price and lowest one  
Ptône,t = β1Ptône,t-1 + β2Ptand,t-1 + β3Poti,t-1 + β4Pkpen,t-1  + 
β5Jan + β6Fev +……….+ β16Dec 
σt




Step 2: Model 2 
As the mean price of each month is known, they can 
be regrouped in two, the highest period (High) and the 
lowest one (Low). These periods are also introduced in 
the regression as dummy variables such as:  
Ptône,t = β1Ptône,t-1 + β2Ptand,t-1 + β3Poti,t-1 + β4Pkpen,t-1  + 
β5High + β6Low 
σt
2 = α0 + αu
2
t-1 + γσt-1
2 + βHigh  
Results and discussions 
An insufficient and incomplete institutional mechanism 
To respond to the difficulties of its members to have 
access to credit, the CAP choose the institutional way 
in developing both informal and formal relationships 
with the main actors involved in the input supply value 
chains in the region through a system that worked for a 
while. In this system, the CAP has played an important 
brokery role. Each year, it ordered agricultural inputs 
from input suppliers, both the government agency 
(DRAEP) and private actors, based on the needs of 
their members. To facilitate the operation the CAP had 
negotiated and signed a contract with the DRAEP 
(fertilizers were still subsidized by the government) for 
fertilizer supplies. So when an individual or a group 
received an input credit from the CMEC, a receipt was 
delivered to get the correspondent input from the CAP. 
For the repayment, the representatives of each group 
were in charge of recovering the amount due by their 
members for deposit at the CMEC. The CAP has 
carried out horizontal coordination by pooling 
member’s demand of inputs and credit; and vertical 
coordination through the contract established with 
input suppliers and the CMEC, then reduced the 
transaction costs both for farmer’s and lender. 
However, this arrangement did not overcome the 
constraint of access to finance for small scale farmers. 
After a short experience, the CMEC recorded an 
important unpaid debt, it hardened the conditions and 
the amount of credit to farmers decreased. The 
institutional mechanism failed to resolve the problem 
of economic coordination risks as indicated by 
Dorward and Kydd (2004). The main reasons of this 
situation were the incapacity of the CMEC to control 
the receipt of borrowers and the absence of a collective 
marketing of the product. To invest in the financing of 
small scale farmers now, the CMEC would like to be 
sure that there is a secure outlet for the production. 
This calls for the integration of a new group of actors, 
i.e. the traders of maize in the mechanism. So there is 
a need to improve the existing arrangement that should 
secure both the CMEC (credit) and farmers (income). 
This is what Poulton (2004) calls second level 
coordination. The essence of this coordination activity 
is the establishment of linkages between input 
suppliers, financiers, output buyers and public service 
providers (extension, research), so that each actor can 
invest, confident that the complementary services that 
the farmers need to make profitable use of their service 
are indeed available (Poulton, 2004). This is what the 
CAP intends to do through the experimentation of the 
inventory credit system. The main questions that they 
raise are: Is it feasible? How can it work? The answers 
to these questions will be addressed in the next 
sections. 
The persistence of the volatility of the maize price over 
the time 
The results of the variance equation indicate that the 
term error coefficients (news on the volatility) are 
positive for the two models as showed in Table 1. So 
Ptône, t = Price in the prefecture of Tône at t 
Ptône, t-1 = Price in the prefecture of Tône at t-1 
Ptand, t-1 = Price in the prefecture of Tandjoaré at t-
1 
Poti, t-1 = Price in the prefecture of Oti at t-1 
Pkpen, t-1 = Price in the prefecture of Kpendjal at t-1 Financing Agricultural Inputs in Northern Togo  
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we obtain a coefficient of 57.37 % and 57.95 % 
respectively for models 1 and 2. It indicates that the 
volatility of the price observed the previous year has 
57% of chance to repeat the next year in the case of 
the two models. Shocks tend to persist over the time. 
In other word the changes in the price have a good 
chance to repeat during the next years. 
The variance of models 1 and 2 is high and is the 
result of high price risk. This characteristic of the 
intra-annual price evolution is favorable for the 
inventory credit system setting-up in the region.  
The planning of storage and selling off of the maize 
Table 2 shows that the coefficients of all dummy 
variables are positive and significant. The highest are 
observed between March and August with a peak in 
June and the lowest one in December. It means that the 
price of maize in the prefecture of Tône is at the high 
level in June and low level in December. In the case of 
the model 2, we can say that there is a difference in the 
price (mean) of 14 FCFA/Kg between the lowest 
period (harvest time) and the highest period. However, 
the best period to constitute the stock is localized 
around December and the period to sell off around 
June in order to capture a difference of 35 FCFA/Kg. 
If we consider the mean, the difference of 14 
FCFA/KG must be sufficient to cover operation cost 
and margins before to conclude about the feasibility of 
the system.  
Contractual relationships for the implementation of 
the inventory credit system  
In the two previous sections, we have shown through 
an econometric analysis that there is a good chance of 
success for the inventory credit system in the region. 
Now, it is important to analyze the institutional aspects 
that will support the new system in order to fill the gap 
observed in the former one. Given that there is no 
professional warehouse keeper in the area, the CAP 
will play this role and products will be stocked into the 
warehouse (to be build). So the inventory credit 
scheme will run as such:  
(i) At the harvest, each farmer’s group will make a 
deposit (stock) of maize at the CAP on behalf of its 
members. The product must be well packaged and the 
name of the owner and the group should be put on 
each bag. A scrupulous control of the quality and the 
quantity will be done both by the CAP and the CMEC 
before the closing of the warehouse with two padlocks, 
one for the CAP and the second one for the CMEC. So 
a deposit certificate is delivered by the CAP to the 
farmer’s groups concerned to guarantee the request of 
loan at the CMEC. The amount of the guarantee 
should be based on the quantity, the quality and above 
all the price of the product at the harvest period (In our 
case, December). The credit will be granted in two 
parts: in kind (for input purchase) an in cash (to do 
another business or for consumption). Then it will be 
easy for the CAP to gather input needs, in order to 
negotiate a good price with input suppliers and for the 
delivery on time.  
(ii) Towards the lean season, we could face two cases. 
Each group can pay back to the CMEC the loan and 
storage fees with the income earned from their 
business if it has been profitable. After the repayment, 
a withdrawal receipt will be given to the group in 
order to get back their products. So they will have 
enough time to negotiate with traders a good price for 
their products. Many of farmers will also choose to use 
the product for family consumption.  
In the case where they cannot pay back with the 
income of their small business (or because they use all 
of the money in cash for consumption or other 
investment), a marketing mechanism led by the CAP 
will be in charge of exploring market outlets and to 
negotiate with traders.  
This activity will start since the constitution of the 
stock and the sale must be collective and well planned. 
Here the CAP has to extend vertical coordination 
through formal contracts with traders that indicate 
clearly the quantity and the quality of maize at a 
designated price. Contract farming reduces both 
production and marketing risk by ensuring a 
guaranteed source of supply with specific quality 
requirements to processors on intermediaries and 
ensuring farmers an immediate market outlet for their 
produce (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2003).  
The main advantage is that the maize price will be 
more attractive at that time (around 14FCFA/KG). At 
the end of the marketing process, a balance sheet will 
be established for each group by deducting their 
repayment amount due and storage fees from their 
receipts. When it is positive, the group will get back 
the balance. To avoid the risk of opportunism the CAP 
have to increase its bargaining power by planning the 
marketing, the differentiation of the offer and/or by 
reducing the production costs in order to be 
competitive. Konlambigue, A. 
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Conclusion 
The institutional arrangement implemented by the 
CAP was not able to overcome markets failures 
because of the lack of downstream vertical 
coordination. The output market has been neglected in 
the mechanism and constitutes a risk for the MFI.  
The inventory credit system that proposes to 
experiment the CAP should, in principle, fill the gap. 
Concerning its feasibility, it has been shown that the 
system has a good chance of success in the area, but 
we need to complete the analysis to verify whether 
14FCFA/KG is enough to cover storage costs and 
margins.  
As the CAP will be involved in contractual 
relationships with traders/processors, there is a big risk 
to become dependent from downstream actors with 
limited negotiation capacity. They need to improve 
their organizational structure by integrating real 
marketing specialists in its staff. They have also to 
improve their bargaining power by developing 
competitive strategies. In this context of contractual 
relationships, the unknown is the capacity or the 
unwillingness of actors to respect their commitment. 
Then, it becomes important to analyze their behavior 
in order to identify the most efficient contract. The 
contract theoretical framework through the principal – 
agent model can be use to model behaviors and 
propose the ‘best’ contract. 
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Table 1. Results of the variance equation 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coefficients  Stand-Dev  Z - Stat  Probability  Coefficients  Stand-Dev  Z - Stat  Probabilité 
α0 376.7897  149.7803  2.515616  0.0119  230.9398  61.13291  3.777667  0.0002 
α 0.573768  0.174677  3.284741  0.0010  0.579528  0.114656  5.054474  0.0000 
γ -0.251031  0.194013  -1.293891  0.1957  -0.330702  0.066585  -4.966593  0.0000 
β         489.1649  64.19332  7.620185  0.0000 Financing Agricultural Inputs in Northern Togo  





























Table 2. Results of the main equation of the regression 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coefficients  Stand-Dev  Z - Stat  Probability  Coefficients  Stand-Dev  Z - Stat  Probability 
β5  114.7457 11.99588  9.565427 0.0000  107.8253 5.725216  18.83340  0.0000 
β6  116.1746 15.77466  7.364629 0.0000  121.8274 8.638004  14.10366  0.0000 
β7  140.5330 14.90054  9.431401 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β8  118.8994 10.64655  11.16789 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β9  125.0648 9.584765  13.04829 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β10  145.3561 13.40453  10.84380 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β11  126.2694 12.00835  10.51513 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β12  125.9813 9.654965  13.04834 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β13  113.4527 7.806306  14.53347 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β14  112.1648 8.612445  13.02357 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β15  110.7511 7.363381  15.04079 0.0000  - -  -  - 
β16 
109.8750 9.651993  11.38365 0.0000 
- -  -  - 